SEGMENT ONE *:BEHIND:*:OUR:*:BACKS:* Anthology of Political Quotes YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2004 in reverse chron order

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Years 1970 through 1989

  • 1989_GORBACHEV.--"I am a Communist, a convinced Communist! For some that may be a fantasy. But to me it is my main goal." -Mikhail Gorbachev, New York Times 1989

  • 1989_SKULL&BONES_COOPER"...Members of the Order (Skull and Bones) take an oath that absolves them from any allegiance to any nation or king or government or constitution, and that includes the negating of any subsequent oath which they may be required to take. They swear allegiance only to the Order and its goal of a New World Order ... according to the oath Bush took when he was initiated into Skull and Bones, his oath of office as President of the United States means nothing." --William Cooper, Behold A Pale Horse, p. 81-82

  • 1988_GORBACHEV.--"Those who hope that we shall move away from the socialist path will be greatly disappointed. Every part of our program of fully based on the principle of more socialism and more democracy." ... "It's my conviction that the human race has entered a stage where we are all dependent on each other. No other country or nation should beregarded in total separation from another, let alone pitted against another. That's what our communist vocabulary calls internationalism and it means promoting universal human values. ... "...I would like to be clearly understood ... we, the Soviet people, are for socialism.... We want more socialism and, therefore, more democracy. ... "More socialism means more democracy, openness and collectivism in everyday life..." --Mikhail Gorbachev, 1988: 'Perestroika - New Thinking for Our Country and the World'

  • 1988_MONARCHY_PR_PHILIP.--"In the event that I am reincarnated, I would like to return as a deadly virus, in order to contribute something to solve overpopulation." --Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh as reported by Deutsche Press Agentur (DPA), Aug. 1988.

  • 1988_REAGAN ADMIN.--"Facts are stupid things." --President Ronald Reagan

  • 1988_MONARCHY_PR_PHILIP.--"I don't claim to have any special interest in natural history, but as a boy I was made aware of the annual fluctuations in the number of game animals and the need to adjust the 'cull' to the size of the surplus population." Preface to 'Down to Earth' by HRH Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, 1988, p.8.

  • 1988_BUSHSr.--"I will never apologize for the United States of America! I don't care what the facts are!" --George Bush, Senior, 1988

  • 1988_BushSr_Campaign--In 1988, when George Bush was on the Presidential Campaign Trail; Barbara Walters interviewed him. She asked him a question that caught him off guard. Barbara asked George if he was a Christian. Bush literally stumbled, looked down for a moment, and answered: "If by being a Christian, you ask if I am 'Born Again,' then yes, I am a Christian."

  • BUSHSr.--"My senior year (at Yale University) I joined Skull and Bones, a secret society," President Bush writes in his autobiography, "so secret, I can't say anything more."

  • 1987_GORBACHEV.--"We are moving toward a new world order, the world of communism. We shall never turn off that road. ... Gentlemen, Comrades, do not be concerned about all you hear about glasnost and perestroika and democracy in the coming years These are primarily for outward consumption. There will be no significant internal change within the Soviet Union, other than for cosmetic purposes. Our purpose is to disarm the Americans and let them fall asleep". -- Mikhial Gorbachev, former President of the Soviet Union, to the Politburo in November of 1987

  • 1986_MONARCHY_PR_PHILIP.--"I just wonder what it would be like to be reincarnated in an animal whose species had been so reduced in numbers than it was in danger of extinction. What would be its feelings toward the human species whose population explosion had denied it somewhere to exist.... I must confess that I am tempted to ask for reincarnation as a particularly deadly virus." --Prince Philip, in his Foreward to 'If I Were an Animal'; United Kingdom, Robin Clark Ltd., 1986.

  • 1984_BUSHSr.--"I'm for Mr. Reagan - blindly."--George Bush [Senior] on the campaign trail, 1984

  • 1983_NAZIS_IN_AMERICA.--

    Sun, 23 Nov 2003 16:11:42 -0000

    Subject: BIBLIOGRAPHY of U.S. NAZI Connections as of Reagan Era

    SEE also original article.

    Good Americans, by John Judge (1983)

    Almost since its inception, the successful revolution ip the Soviet Union in 1917 came under attack.[1] The Romanov family was spirited out of the country, along with the royal treasury.[2] The monarchists, the White Russian counter-revolutionaries, and the colonial powers of France, Germany, England, and even the United States saw the great wealth of Russia as a prize worth regaining or winning.

    From 1918 to 1932, that royal treasury, as well as funds from rich monarchist families, international investors, and U.S. investors led by President Herbert Hoover, poured into the secret plans for the military rearmament of Germany.[3] Monarchists from around the world, and White Russians, began an international network of reaction known as the Solidarists.  Inside the Vatican, relying on an alleged apparition of the Virgin Mary at Fatima who warned the Pope about the fall of the Tsar, powerful forces worked to assist in toppling the new Bolshevik rule.

    A group of the most fanatically-conservative elements of the Catholic Church -- men who still supported the inquisition in Spain and who used flagellation as prayer -- formed a lay order known as Opus Dei, the Works of God.[4]  These were joined in rank by the ancient military order of the church -- the secretive 'Knights Hospitallers,' or the Knights of Malta.[5] Their ultimate objective was the downfall of the new Soviet government.  No method or means was too extreme, so these forces backed -- and helped to create -- Franco in Spain, Mussolini in Italy, and Hitler in Germany. Some U.S. firms continued their financial trade and support of the fascists throughout all of World War II, with Russia as the target.[6]

    But the fascist offensive failed at Stalingrad, though the cost had been enormous: with 22 million Soviet citizens dead. At this crucial turning point, they retreated and retrenched, adding to their ranks the embittered revanchists of Eastern Europe, the "cold warriors"and Klansmen of America, and even worse elements.  From 1943 forward, plans began to escalate the "cold war" of propaganda and paramilitary spying into the nuclear exchange of World War III.[7] Still, no other goal was so important as the "recapture" of Mother Russia into monarchist and fascist hands. But now they had also added the perspective of the eugenicists and the "scientific" racists of the Third Reich, who saw most of the non-white world as expendable.[8]

    The term "useless eaters" was applied by the Nazi doctors to their concentration camp victims, and later by former CIA director William Colby to the peoples of Mexico.

    Add to this international fascist cabal the following sources of power: Kameradenwerk, Die Spinne and Odessa -- the secret webs of Nazi SS men and mass murderers who escaped justice after the war, and found a home in Europe, South America and the obliging United States.[9]


    The Belarus Brigade were the dreaded combined forces of Nazi and White Russian troops in Byelorussia during World War II; a counter- revolutionary stronghold since World War I, and a Nazi-infested army against Russia. THESE FORMER TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, NEARLY 300 OF THEM, WERE BROUGHT TO THE UNITED STATES AND GIVEN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT AND INTELLIGENCE JOBS BY OUR THANKFUL CIA AND OSS.[11]

    Dictatorships arose in South America and throughout the world, whose fascist rhetoric and genocidal direction come directly from Nazi collusion and training, not historical chance.[12]

    Then there was the Gehlen Network -- a 'black orchestra' of spies whose infamous dealings during World War II had put the Nazi spies 'in bed' with every major intelligence network in the world, from British M15 and M16, to the American OSS and the heavily- infiltrated KGB.[13] Under the evil genius of Allen Dulles, whose espionage attacks on the Soviet Union dated back to the 1920's, $200 million in Rockefeller and Mellon funds were directed into the hands of Hitler's spy-master Reinhard Gehlen and his 350 Nazi spies, who formed and founded our Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.[14]

    Later, these same forces created post-war European intelligence, our Defense Intelligence Agency, our National Security Agency, and covert groupings here and abroad whose very initials are considered classified information.[15]

    THESE ARE ASSASSINS -- AN INTERNATIONAL FASCIST NETWORK OF TERROR, CONGEALED IN THE GREY UNDERWORLD OF MAFIA MURDERS, DRUG TRAFFICKING, GUN SMUGGLING AND POLITICAL MURDERS WORLDWIDE.[16] These mercenary armies still draw their ranks from refugees encamped everywhere, still operate with names like Alpha 66 and Omega 7, [17] AAA or DINA, the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai Shek, the Somocistas along the Honduran border now, the Hmong peoples of Laos, and the reactionary ranks of the Vietnamese, the Phalangists in Lebanon, and even the Grey Wolves of Turkey, whose members include Mehmet Ali Agca, the attempted assassin of the Pope now so falsely accused of working with the Soviet KGB.[18]

    And, of course, Interpol -- An international police intelligence agency begun at the end of World War II in collaboration with Nazi war criminals and our own J. Edgar Hoover of FBI fame.[19]

    These elements meet internationally under the aegis of organizations like the World Union of National Socialists, the Asian People's Anti- Communist League, and the World Anti-Communist League.  Their cover is provided by "journalists" like Claire Sterling, [20] and Marvin Kalb of Opus Dei.[21] Their legitimacy and recruiting is aided by evangelical fronts like "World Vision" which runs many of the refugee camps, and includes John W. Hinckley, Sr.[22] They draw their funds from the illegal and profitable world heroin and cocaine trade, [23] and their training from CIA experts like Mitch WerBell, Edwin Wilson, Frank Terpil and unreconstructed Nazi torturers who provide techniques.[24] Their weapons come from an equally lucrative gun smuggling trade, assisted by intelligence agencies.[25]

    This is the real historical framework of current events, that follow from "cold war" to "COINTELPRO" and "CHAOS" [26] from the framing of the Rosenbergs to "Operation Garden Plot" [27] from Alger Hiss to the "Houston Plan" [28] from McCarthy to "MK-ULTRA,"[29] from the Third Reich to the Fourth.

    What the Dulles brothers engineered, [30] the massive cold-war lie [31] that justified any excess in the direction of fascism, is the root of Malcolm X's statement on Vietnam, that "the chickens are going to come home to roost. Under the current rubric of the World Anti-Communist League, [32] the Solidarists, the Nazis and other fascists, the reactionary forces in every part of the globe unite to bring us a legacy of deception and murder, of war profits and starvation, of open dictatorial rule.

    Their now three-quarter-century-old goal of crushing the Soviet revolution has brought us to both financial and physical ruin, and to the brink of World War III.[33] To attain that goal, fascism has come home to roost.[34]

    During World War II, the Nazis in France gained collaboration and capitulation by going first to the task of corrupting the courts, compromising the judges, and turning the slim hope of judicial justice into a political weapon.[35]

    In our own country, the most respected Justice of the Supreme Court was unable to solve the obvious case of conspiracy in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

    The primary role of the state police has become spying and suppression of legitimate attempts to challenge the undemocratic and secret rule of the national security state.[36]

    THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW NOW IS TO PUT THE PROTECTION OF PROFITS ABOVE PEOPLE AT ALL COSTS, EVEN TO THE POINT OF POLICE DESTRUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO RECONSTRUCT THE CRIME.[37] Do you think we are in some better or more holy condition in our own courts today? What special sort of American chauvinism leads us to blindly assert "it can't happen here!"--for it has.

    In a recent editorial in the Boston Globe, dated February 14, 1983, we can see the delayed reaction of the established press shortly after the extradition of Klaus Barbie, [38] the Nazi "Butcher of Lyons," from Bolivia to France:

    "BARBIE is only one of many notorious Nazi leaders who were welcomed like prodigal sons into service with Western intelligence agencies after the war. Their unspeakable crimes against humanity were implicitly forgiven and conveniently forgotten. They were paid and protected so that they could return to active duty in the anti-Communist crusade which their fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, had temporarily discredited with his extremism.

    "Their names compose a rogue's gallery of fascist thuggery. Hitler's master spy, Reinhard GEHLEN, was made chief of the Western German intelligence agency (BND) and shared his Nazi intelligence data with his protectors in the CIA."; Otto SKORZENY, a Nazi specialist at organizing terror networks in occupied countries, was employed in the U.S. Army's historical division, which served as a way-station for former Nazis who would go on to serve in the Gehlen-CIA intelligence network; Skorzeny used his tacit immunity to shepherd old Nazi comrades out of Europe, working through cover organizations, known as Odessa, Kamaradenwerk, and Die Spinne.

    "As the years went by, Gehlen, Skorzeny and their network of old-boy collaborators accumulated enormous influence both In Europe and Latin America. Skorzeny shuttled between Franco's Spain and Peron's Argentina, where he served the Argentine dictator as a gray eminence.  His goal was to foster the growth of a fascist Fourth Reich centered in Latin America.

    "He could count on such loyalist operatives as Josef MENGELE in Paraguay, on Adolf EICHMANN and Hans Ulrich RUDEL in Argentina; on Walter RAUFF in Chile; and on Klaus BARBIE in Bolivia.

    "To grasp the full meaning of BARBIE's belated appointment with justice, his career may be seen as an emblem of the unchecked metastasis of fascism. It is particularly mortifying for Americans to be reminded that our government put Barbie on its payroll a few years after he worked for Hitler."

    George BUSH -- Former head of the CIA who employed, among others, U.S. Army officer, Capt. William Rhine of the Bay of Pigs operation. Rhine is really top SS spy Helmut Streicher, who worked directly with Hitler, Gehlen, Otto Skorzeny, and then U.S. Army Intelligence from October, 1945 on.[77]

    Anna CHENNAULT -- A Nixon confidant, and head of the old "China Lobby" that got us involved in both Korea and Vietnam.[69] Her husband, General Claire Chennault, formed the 'Flying Tigers' in World War II, which later flew heroin for the CIA from Vietnam as "Air America." [70] She sits on the board of 20th Century Fox with Henry Kissinger, William Rogers, Gerald Ford, and the late Princess Grace Kelly of Monaco.[71]

    General Lucius CLAY -- The military commander of Germany at the end of the war, Clay helped undermine the prosecution of Otto Skorzeny, and later worked with Nazi generals at Oberammergau to train Eastern European revanchists, Nazis and American GIs into the 5,000- strong "Special Forces" against communism. This team later became our Green Berets.[44]

    Erhard DABRINGHAUS of U.S. Army Intelligence sheltered RAUFF, paid him $1700 a month to run a spy network in France, and helped him escape to South America. "I am a good American of German extraction and I did my job," he said recently from his position as a German history professor at Wayne State University.[39]

    George DE MOHRENSCHILDT -- His whole family was Byelorussian, and rabidly anti-communist after their fortune was lost to the revolution at the Nobel family oil fields. They moved to Germany and worked with the Nazis during World War II. George was a spy, carrying papers from Nelson Rockefeller after the war, and his cousin Baron Meyerling was a Nazi film propagandist. His brother, Von, was put to work at the Pentagon after the war, and now sits on the CIA's Tolstoy Foundation. His wife was related to CIA and OSS employees, and her father ran the railroads in China before Mao took power. George later lost another oil fortune of his own in Cuba following the ouster of Battista by Fidel Castro.[128] He was the contact for the Oswalds to the White Russian Solidarist community in Dallas, and the CIA "babysitter" and best friend to Lee Harvey Oswald. De Mohrenschildt introduced the Oswalds to the Paines, and it was Ruth Paine who got Oswald the job in the Texas School Book Depository, and lied to the Warren Commission about "Oswald's rifle" and set him up as the patsy in the Kennedy assassination.[129]

    Peter DRUCKER -- Well-known industrialist who began the multinational corporation concept, he was responsible for bringing Nazi leader Fritz Kraemer from Frankfurt to the Pentagon.[73]

    Allen DULLES -- Who collaborated with Gehlen's spies, headed the CIA, and later sat on the Warren Commission investigation of John F. Kennedy's death.[41]

    Errol FLYNN -- The famed actor, whose exploits included meetings with Nazi sympathizers, and the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, and Nazi spymasters during the late 30s. His roommate and constant companion at the time was actor Ronald Reagan.[68]

    J. Peter GRACE -- A scion of the Grace fortunes, he is currently head of Reagan's commission to study domestic economic cuts.[56] For 30 years his company employed Otto Ambrose, a Nazi war criminal from the German drug cartel I.G. Farben. Ambrose, a chemist, developed "Zyklon B," the actual gas used in the chambers to kill the Jews and others deemed "inferior."[57]

    The German steel group, Flick, which has extensive Nazi ties in the past and whose scandals are rocking German politics today, hold a controlling stock interest in the Grace company.[58] The Grace family is intimately involved with the formation of the anti- Communist American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).[59] AIFLD played a key role in the Kissinger plan to overthrow Allende in Chile, and insert the ruling fascist Pinochet.[60] After the coup, which involved American Green Berets, [61] Kissinger sent a Mr. Rauff from the State Department to advise the newly formed Chilean secret police (DINA).  Rauff had been in charge of the "mobile ovens" used to kill Gypsies and Jews, homosexuals and political dissidents in Eastern Europe for the Nazis.[62] These same forces were later involved in the assassination of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C.[63]

    J. Edgar HOOVER -- Who formed the FBI, and without whose help Nazi criminals could never have entered the U.S., worked in Interpol with founder Reinhard Heydrich, SS head of Nazi police from 1940 to 1942, and his successor, SS officer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, later hanged at Nuremberg.[80] Hoover's career involved extensive mob connections, [81] and his death has yet to be fully investigated.[82]

    Henry KISSINGER -- Worked with General Lucius Clay at Oberammergau, and then with key stateside Army Intelligence and CIA units responsible for bringing in the Nazi spies.[45] Kissinger, who came from Germany to join U.S. Army Intelligence during World War II, had as his "mentor" the mysterious Fritz KRAEMER.[46] KRAEMER's 30-year silent career in the Pentagon plans division includes the prepping of Alexander Haig.[47] It may also conceal his real identity -- prisoner #33 in the dockets at Dachau, the special Lieutenant to Hitler, Fritz Kraemer.[48] Mr. Kissinger still relies on his advice, and did so while Secretary of State.

    C.D. JACKSON -- Joined Nelson Rockefeller and Richard Nixon in the scheme to bring the Byelorussian government here. He worked for the Henry Luce publishing empire, and for Life magazine when they published the doctored photos of Lee Harvey Oswald holding a rifle. Both Time and Life were owned by Luce, and were responsible for much of the cold-war propaganda that allowed the national security state and the Pentagon to grow untouched.[49]

    Michael LEDEEN -- Reagan's appointed state department official was the unofficial source for the "Bulgarian Connection" lies about the KGB role in the shooting of the Pope. He was the major source on "Soviet terrorism" misinformation to Claire Sterling, who deftly covers up fascist terrorism and state terrorism alike.[108] Ledeen has close ties to Alexander Haig, the Georgetown University grouping, Henry Kissinger, Licio Gelli Opus Dei, and the P-2 Masonic Lodge scandal.[109] He is also close to Francesco Pazienza, suspected to have set "God's Banker" Roberto Calvi for murder. At the time of his death, Calvi was director of Banco Ambrosiano, and his family members openly claim he-was killed by Opus Dei.[111]

    Nicolae MALAXA--In fact, a special bill was introduced in Congress to secure his citizenship by Senator Pat McCarren of Nevada. McCarren and Senator Joe McCarthy later introduced legislation to set up "detention and internment camps" in the U.S. in times of war or national emergency for "internal security." [51]

    General Douglas MACARTHUR -- Another World War II hero, he helped to cover up Japanese war crimes involving chemical and biological experiments on American prisoners so that we could use the secret results.[78] This operation and others directly involved MacArthur's chief of staff, Colonel Charles Willoughby, who is in reality a Nazi criminal, Kurt WEIDENBACH.[79]

    John J. MCCLOY -- A High Commissioner of Germany after the war, who pardoned key Nazi criminals like Krupp, Abs, Dohrnberger, Schacht, and others.[42] His long career has made him a "Godfather of the American establishment. He sat atop the World Bank, directed construction of the Pentagon, worked with Earl Warren to set up the Japanese concentration camps in America, and blocked any military attacks on the Nazi death camps during his tenure as Assistant Secretary of War. He stopped the summary execution of Nazis in favor of the Nuremberg Trials, which he later thwarted, and also sat as a member of the Warren Commission.[43]

    Richard Milhous NIXON -- Former President whose work with Navy Intelligence at the end of World War II included the importation of Nazi criminals through the Gould family estate on Long Island. Among them was Nicolae MALAXA, whose collaboration with Hermann Goering was apparently no problem for Nixon, who defended Malaxa's U.S. citizenship.[50]

    Evita PERON -- Once a ruler in Argentina, Evita got her funds from the Nazi treasuries stolen by Martin Bormann at the end of the war, and put hundreds of millions in the "Evita Peron Foundation" and Swiss bank accounts. This money aided war criminals like Josef Mengele, Heinrich Dorge, Hjalmar Schacht (who had worked under Herman Abs at the Reichsbank), Rudolf Freude, Dr. Fritz Thyssen Dr. Gustav Krupp, Otto Skorzeny, and others.[72]

    RAUFF, who is charged with sending 97,000 Jews to their death, has served as a revered adviser to the fascist dictatorship imposed on Chile by Augusto Pinochet after the overthrow of Salvador Allende, and was instrumental in setting up the infamous Chilean secret police agency known as DINA. Barbie, in Bolivia, organized paramilitary death squads and drug smuggling networks for a succession of military regimes.

    Once the cast of characters is clear, the interconnections continue. One of the front companies used by Wilson and Terpil in California, TCI, was founded by Helene von Damm and Otto Albrecht VON BOISCHWING. [116] The relative importance of von BoIschwing cannot be underestimated. He was placed in charge of the Gehlen-CIA network in the United States when Gehlen returned to Germany to set up their post-war intelligence agency.[117] Many of the people mentioned already have direct or indirect links to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, later political murders, and their coverups.[118] Others make the connections of the international fascist cabal very clear in the murder of John F. Kennedy and many more progressive leaders.

    Helene VON DAMM -- Personal White House appointment secretary long- time personal secretary to Ronald Reagan, she stands to be appointed Ambassador to Vienna, and controlled cabinet level appointments in the Reagan administration.[64] She came to the United States in the 1950s in the company of von Bolschwing, and worked for him as a translator.[65] Von Bolschwing gave the direct orders to Adolph Eichmann in the dread Eisenstatz, group, the SS killers.[66] Helene's husband, Christian von Damm, ran the Bank of America in La Paz, Bolivia, which defaulted on a huge U.S. loan.[67]

    Father E. WALSH -- His Georgetown University Center for International Affairs and Strategic Studies became the first major CIA training center.[96] This Jesuit priest was the motivating force behind Joe McCarthy's campaign against "communism" in the 50s, and he is a long- time member of the Knights of Malta.[97]

    Frank G. WISNER -- An official of the OSS and a CIA veteran who brought the Byelorussian government here, the Latvian Thunder Cross, the Hungarian Arrow Cross, and the Roumanian Iron Guard among others. As many as 5,000 came to work at Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the CIA, the Voice of America, the Defense Language Institute, "for the United States in defense of liberty."[54] Allen Dulles said of Gehlen, "He's on our side now." Bobby Inman of the NSA and CIA networks today admitted recently that these fascists were "the bedrock" of covert operations in Europe in the 40s and 50s by the CIA, and molded the anti-communist policy there.[55]

    These people, and those who aided them, have names, addresses, and connections to the top levels of the United States government. They figure prominently in the hidden history of our police-intelligence state, and in the rash of political assassinations and other crimes that keep it in place. The names of the men most responsible for bringing them here read like a roll call of the world establishment, and those who collaborated with them fit together like pieces of a puzzle in decoding events since World War II.[40]

    Other figures involved in this dirty little secret connect to the highest levels of our government and intelligence agencies. The solemn pledge to end the Nazi regime was completely betrayed.[52] Instead, the British and American spies saw a more important function -- that of finding a new common enemy. The cohesiveness and control offered by this scenario seemed to urgent and so appealing that they even considered creating the illusion of an enemy from outer space.[53] For the less inventive, the communist revolution still served as sufficient scapegoat, and historical target.

    These are only a few of the connections that history has hidden, only a few of the fascists brought to light, their worst crimes still unexposed.[134]

    This is the dirtiest secret of post-war America: our vast intelligence networks were a haven for -- and eventually a tool in -- the hands of international fascism. The increasing challenge to simple Constitutional rights is a direct result of the legislative and political role, played behind the closed door of "security" by these elements. The growing threat to the already damaged economy by the military-industrial complex is out of control. All is geared to a new world war, a bloodbath in sections of the Third World, a reduction of population worldwide. The attacks in Congress and the courts on rights are the prelude to open martial law and fascist rule in America -- a new "final solution." [135]

    "When they came for the Jews, I did nothing for I am not a Jew ... when they came for me, who was left to defend me?" asked Martin Niemoller of Germany in the 1940s. The continuing murders of labor leaders, musicians, political dissidents, progressive thinkers, Black and Hispanic leaders, and others here in the United States parallels the hundreds of political murders in the late 20s and early 30s in Weimar Germany that preceded Hitler's rise to power.[136] When the came for the socialists and communists in the 1950s, the targets of the Smith Act and other repressive treatment, many of us did not act since we were not members of such organizations. Will we make the mistake twice?

    Hanging solemnly over the mass murder at Jonestown, Guyana, was the George Santayana quote, "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it."[137] We are not far from the open collusion of the courts in all aspects of state repression. Recent events must be seen for what they are, an attack on us all, spearheaded by the very forces of reaction that threaten life and freedom worldwide, hiding beneath the cloak of anti-communism. To sit back now will put us in a category akin to Klaus Barbie's Army Intelligence contact, Ernst Dabringhaus. Will we be "Good Germans of American extraction" and "do our job" or will we rise up?

    -- John Judge

    (Based on my own research and that of Mae Brussell, [138] and the few researchers looking into the truth of what became of democracy in America.)

    _ _ _


    1. On a Field of Red, Anthony Cave Brown; Donovan of OSS, Corey Ford; The Great Conspiracy, Sayers & Kahn.

    2.The Rescue of the Romanovs, Richards; The File on the Tsar, Anthony Sampson; The Conspirator Who Saved the Romanovs, Hull.

    3.Donovan of OSS, Corey Ford; The Great Conspiracy, Sayers & Kahn; Trading with the Enemy, Charles Higham; Who Financed Hitler?, Pool.

    4. "John Paul's Shock Troops," Time, 9/20/82; "Showdown for the Jesuits," New York Times Magazine, 2/14/82.

    5. "The Men Behind the Counter-Reformation," Kevin Coogan, Parapolitics, #6, 3/31/82, The Knights Templar, Stephen Houston; Real Lace, Stephan Birmingham.

    6. Trading With the Enemy, Charles Higham; Behind the Nylon Curtain, Zaeiff.

    7. The Nazis Go Underground, Kurt Reiss; Germany Will Try It Again, Sigrid Schultz; The Plot Against the Peace, Sayers & Kahn.

    8. The Legacy of Malthus, Allen Chase; From Genesis to Genocide, Stephan Chorover.

    9. Aftermath, Ladislas Farago; The Bormann Brotherhood, William Stephenson; Spiderweb, Joseph Persico; Skorzeny: Hitler's Commando, Glen Infield; Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile, Paul Manning; Skorzeny, Charles Whiting; Hitler's Heirs, Paul Meskil; The Damned Engineers, Janice Giles; The Pledge Betrayed: Denazification of Post-War Germany, Bower; The Nazis Among Us, Charles Allen, Jr.

    10. Project Paperclip, Lansby; Power Shift, Kirkpatric Sale.

    11. The Belarus Secret, John Loftus.

    12. The Washington Connection & Third World Fascism, Herman, Chomsky; Bitter Fruit: Untold Story of American Coup in Guatemala, Schlesinger; An American Company, McCann; Missing, Powers; "The Knights Who Fight Communism," SF Chronicle 12/19/74; "The Nazi Legacy: Military Might in Latin America" San Jose Mercury, 3/21/82.

    13. Gehlen: Spy of the Century, E.H. Cookeridge; The Service, Reinhard Gehlen; A Man Called Intrepid, William Stephenson; Armies of Ignorance, Corson.

    14. The Yankee & Cowboy War, Oglesby.

    15. "CBS Reports Aid to Nazi Collaborators,"UPI, 5/13/82; They Call It Intelligence, Joachim Joesten.

    16. The Great Heroin Coup, Henrik Kruger; The Secret War Report of the OSS, Anthony Cave Brown.

    17. "Omega 7,"Gallery, 11/81.

    18. The I48. Pictorial History of the SS -- 1923-1945, Mollo (Photo Kramer, Dachau trial, '46; "World Watcher's" #593, side 2 (sheet accompanies taped broadcast by Mae Brussell), reprints photo from Defense Audiovisual Agency of Dr. Fritz G.A. Kraemer, Pentagon, 1970, for comparison; Hitler's Bodyguards, Allan Wykes (Photo Fritz Kramer, #33, Malmedy trial) (NOTE: Dr. Fritz G.A. Kraemer currently with the Institute on Strategic Trade, 490 S. Capitol St., Ste. 404A, Washington, D.C. 20023, along with Ernest Lefever and Dr. Stefan Possony, members of the World Anti-Communist League).

    19. Life, 11/64; Luce; The Belarus Secret, op. cit.

    20. Wanted. The Search for Nazis in America, op. cit.; " How Nixon Came to Power," Mae Brussell, The Realist, August, 1972; (An article appeared in the New York Times, 12/8/73, concerning a 20-year employee of the INS who quit over the Malaxa case and the Nixon connection.)

    21. Spying on Americans, op cit.; "Concentration Camps in America?" Look, 1968 (Charles Allen, Jr.).

    22. The Pledge Betrayed, op. cit.

    23. Messengers of Deception, Jacques Vallee.

    24. The Belarus Secret, op. cit.

    25. "Bobby Inman, Smartest Spy," Playboy, 5/82; Gehlen, Spy of the Century, op. cit.; Inman quote from appearance at University of Pennsylvania, 2/83.

    26. "Grace is Named to Lead U.S. Cost Control Survey," New York Times, 3/6/82.

    27. "Reagan Appointee J. Peter Grace Under Fire," LA Times, 4/24/82; "Reagan Choice's Link to War Criminal," SF Chronicle, 3/6/82; Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, Joseph Borkin.

    28. "German Politicians Implicated in Scam," SF Chronicle, 11/29/82.

    29. "The Amazing Grace," NACLA Latin America & Empire Report.

    30. CIA & American Labor: Subversion of the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy, George Morris; The Murder of Allende, Rojas Sandford.

    31. "Ex-Green Beret Unfolds Secret Life," New York Times Magazine, 7/5/82.

    32. "How Nixon Came to Power," Mae Brussell, The Realist, August, 1972.

    33. Assassination on Embassy Row, Landau & Dinges; Labyrinth, Propper & Branch; Death in Washington, Freed & Landis; "Letters Say Chile Aided Letelier Murder Figure," Washington Post, 2/23/82.

    34. "Politics, Ambassadorships," New York Times, 11/16/82.

    35. "Ex-Nazi's Brilliant Career Strangled in a Web of Lies," San Jose Mercury, 11/20/81.

    36. The Order of the Death's Head, Heinz Hohne; "The Dark Past He Couldn't Escape," SF Chronicle, 11/21/82; "Former Nazi Gives Up U.S. Citizenship," Houston Post, 12/23/81.

    37. "Bolivia Pledges to Pay Foreign Debt," SF Examiner, 9/9/82.

    38. Errol Flynn: The Untold Story, Charles Higharn (NOTE: Flynn's SS contact was Dr. Herman Friedrick Erban, who joined the Nazis in 1922, the Gestapo in 1930, and became a U.S. citizen.)

    39. The Hidden History of the Korean War, I.F. Stone; The War Conspiracy, Peter Dale Scott.

    40. Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, op. cit.; Air America, Christopher Robbins.

    41. Indecent Exposure, David McClintick; "Kissinger, E.B. Williams Named to Fox Board," LA Times, 1/11/81.

    42. Skorzeny. Hitler's Commando, op. cit.; Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile, op. cit.

    43. Adventures of a Bystander, Peter Drucker.

    44. Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, op. cit.; Luciano Project, Campbell; Luciano Story, Feder & Joesten.

    45. The Last Days of Patton, Ladislas Farago.

    46. Ibid.

    47. "The CIA's Man for All Nations," Gung-Ho, May, 1982 (William Seymour).

    48. The Devil's Gluttony, Seiichi Morimura (Japan, 1982); "The Japanese Experiments," 60 Minutes, CBS, 4/4/82; "Germ Tests: Manchurian Mask Lifted," LA Times, 12/9/82; "A Hidden Chapter in History," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 10/81; "Japan Killed U.S. POW's in Experiments," Washington Post, 9/31/81.

    49. American Caesar, William Manchester.

    50. The Interpol Connection, op. cit.

    51.John Edgar Hoover, Hank Messick.

    52. "The Senate Committee is Part of the Coverup," Mae Brussell The Realist, August, 1973.

    53. Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, op. cit.

    54. 30 Against the Mob, Dewey.

    55. Inside the Vatican, Bulle; The Pontiff, The Final Conclave, Malachi Martin; The Rise & Fall of the Roman Catholic Church, Malachi Martin; "Vatican Vortex," Wall Street Journal, 7/2/82.

    86. Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile, op. cit.

    87. "Pope Once Slaved for Vatican Aide's Firm," SF Chronicle, 1/12/83.

    88. Crime & Punishment of I.G. Farben, op. cit.; Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile, op. cit.; All Honorable Men, James Martin; (NOTE: Carl Duisberg, the founder of IG Farben, sent his son to the U.S. in 1933 to start I.G. Farben in New Jersey. Herman Schmitz, head of the operation in Germany, worked with Otto Skorzeny. His brother, D.A. Schmitz, became a U.S. citizen and had a son here, Robert Schmitz. Robert, a nephew to the head of I.G. Farben, worked with Charles E. Wilson of General Electric, who openly favored the "permanent war economy" we now suffer under. Wilson is famous for his quote: "What's good for General Electric is good for the country." G.E. was later to use Ronald Reagan for promotional efforts, and brought him national prominence.)

    89. "Ex-Reich Aide in Vatican Irks Jews," Philadelphia Inquirer, 12/30/82.

    90. Ibid.

    91. "Opus Dei Strengthened", SF Chronicle, 11/29/82.

    92. The Deputy, Rolf Hochhuth.

    93. "The Men Behind the Counter-Reformation," op. cit.

    94. Why Vietnam, A. Paddi.

    95. Final Report on Vietnam, General Westmoreland; Deadly Deceits, Frank McGehee.

    96. Invisible Government, op. cit.

    97. The Dollar & The Vatican, Avro Manhattan (London); The Answer to Tailgunner Joe, Roy Cohn.

    98. Tracing Martin Bormann, I. Bezymensky.

    99. Invitation to an Inquest, op. cit.

    100. "Roy Cohn Joins Board of Anti-Communist Group," New York Times, 5/15/82; "The Men Behind the Counter-Reformation," op. cit.

    101. "The Iron Mentor: Fritz Kraemer," Washington Post, 3/2/75; "Haig's Campaign of Cunning," Playboy, 8/82.

    102. "International Operation of P-2 Directed from U.S." New York Times, 5/31/81; "The Ledeen Connection," In These Times, 9/8/82.

    103. The Vatican Connection, Richard Hammer; "How the Vatican Bank Got Itself Implicated in the Ambrosiano Scandal," Wall Street Journal, 11/23/82; "Italian Authorities Find Possible Link Between Secret Lodge and Banco Ambrosiano," Wall Street Journal, 9/15/82; "Scandal Erupts Over Italian Masonic Lodge," New York Times, 5/26/81; "Fraud, Fascism & the Vatican Connection," Guardian, 1/19/83; "P-2 Revelations are Startling," In These Times, August 12/15, 1982.

    104. "Milan Mystery . . . A Murky Maze," Wall Street Journal, 8/30/82; "Convicted Italian Banker Found Hanged in London," Houston Post, 6/20/82.

    105. "Wotta Knight," New York Daily News, 1/9/83 (Alexander Haig and Rev. Francis Haig). (NOTE: Other Knights in key positions of power include the following: William Casey (CIA Director), Franklyn Nofziger (White House aide), Richard V. Allen (Nat. Security Advisor), James G. Watt (Sec. of Interior), D. Lowell Jensen (Asst. Sec. General), Raymond J. Donovan (Sec. of Labor), James Buckley (Undersec. of Security), Fred Fielding (Nixon Watergate counsel), E. Pendleton James (Watergate, Reagan), John D.J. Moore (Amb. Ireland, Grace Co.), Felix Larkin (Pentagon counsel, Grace Co.), Robert Millikan (Citibank, Grace Co.), Reinhard Gehlen (Nazi, CIA, since 1948), Nicholas Brady (Spellman, Pacelli, Grace), Robert Abplanalp (Nixon confidant), Joseph Bettinger (Bilderberger, Bernhard), Wild Bill Donovan (OSS, Nazis), Peter Flanigan (Nixon, Grace), Barron Hilton (of the hotels), Lee Iacocca (Ford Motor Co.), Joseph Kennedy (father of JFK, RFK), James Ling (Ling, Temco, Vogt), Michele Sindona (Vatican scandal, P-2), John Volpe (Amb. Italy, P-2). For more information, see article cited above, "Men Behind the Counter- Reformation".

    106. "Bludhorn Dies, Head of G&W Empire," New York Times, 2/21/83; "Death of G&W Founder Stirs Wall Street Interest," Houston Post, 3/15/83; "G&W and Dominican Republic," New York Times, 8/21/79; "Antonio Guzman, Dominican President Shot to Death,", NYT, 7/5/82; In God's Name, David Yallop, (Marcinkus, Sindona, Gelli connection)

    107. Kirk Kerkorian: American Success Story, Dial Torgerson; Indecent Exposure, op. cit. (Music Corporation of America source?)

    108. "The Ledeen Connection," In These Times, 9/8/82; The Real Terror Network, op. cit.

    109. "The Ledeen Connection," op. cit.

    110. "God's Banker," Frontline, ABC, op. cit.

    111. "New Inquest Set in Calvi's Death," New York Times, 3/30/83; Family Doubts Death . . . was Suicide," Wall Street Journal, 8/19/82.

    112. "Navy Boss' Probe: Revolving Door or Defense Iron Triangle?" Chicago Tribune, 1/5/83; "Shift of Funds to F-18 Production Riles Congress," Wall Street Journal, 1/24/83; "Lehman Denies Improper Ties to Firm," DC Times, 12/28/82; "Ethics Unit Probes Lehman", Washington Post, 12/28/82

    113. "Why Grace was Murdered", National Examiner, 11/2/82 (Linedecker and Brussell); "A World Without Grace: 7 Unanswered Questions", Philadelphia Magazine, June, 1983; The Fairytale Business:, Forbes, 10/11/82; "A New Role for Princess Grace", New York Post, 9/7/82; American Swastika, Charles Higham (Monaco Nazis).

    114. "NBC Says CIA Agents Under Investigation," San Jose Mercury, 3/24/83; "Documents Undercut Case Against Bulgarian Papal Plot," LA Times, 3/30/83; "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope . . . Disinformation," op. cit.

    115. "World's #1 Dealer," LA Times, 12/9/81 (Cummings); "Arms & The Man," Washington Post Magazine, 10/19/81; "Frank Terpil," 60 Minutes, CBS, 11/15/81; "Confessions of a Dangerous Man," PBS, op. cit.

    116. "Ex-Nazi's Brilliant U.S. Career Strangled in a Web of Lies," San Jose Mercury, 11/20/81.

    117. Ibid.; The Secret History of the SS, Glenn Infield.

    118. Nomenclature of an Assassination Cabal, William Torbitt; The Dallas Conspiracy, Peter Dale Scott (unpublished ms.); The Kennedy Conspiracy, Paris Flammonde; The Secret Team, Fletcher Prouty; They've Killed the President, Robert Sam Anson; Assassinations: Dallas & Beyond, Scott, et al; Coup d'état in America, Webberman & Canfield; Treason for my Daily Bread, Mikhail Lebedev; Eagle Times, June 1982 (Vatican, Permindex links).

    119. Dora: Nazi Concentration Camp Where Space Technology was Born, Michel; The Rocket Team, Ordway, et al.

    120. Nomenclature of an Assassination Cabal, op. cit.

    121. Ibid.

    122. Inside the Third Reich, Albert Speer; Project Paperclip, op. cit. 123. Secret Agents, Hurt; Project Paperclip, op cit.

    124. Coup d'état in America, op. cit.

    125. Ibid.

    126. Marina & Lee, Priscilla Johnson McMillan; Coup d'état in America, op. cit.

    127. Marina & Lee, op. cit.

    128. The Kennedy Conspiracy, op. cit.; Coup d'état in America, op cit.; Who Killed Kennedy? Buchanan.

    129. Coup d'état in America, op. cit.

    130. Ibid.

    131. The Killing of Corporal Kunze, Wilma Parrell.

    132. Warren Commission Report.

    133. Ibid.

    134. The interconnections multiply, and the Joe McCarthy story is but one indication. Fr. Walsh, his "mentor," worked with the Papal Relief Mission in the 1920s, along with Herbert Hoover, as a cover to rearm the monarchists. McCarthy was supported directly by Nazis here in the U.S., including Frank Seusenbrenner, then President of the Board of the University of Wisconsin, and Walter Harnishfeger. In turn, McCarthy took over the Senate hearings on the Massacre at Malmedy to cover the Nazi criminals. Other examples of interlinks abound: Charles Willoughby, really Weidenbach, helped found Young Americans for Freedom in Dallas in 1963, which had a role in the JFK assassination. Also involved there was Robert Morris, a Navy intelligence psy-war expert in World War II, who chaired the Committee to Restore Internal Security, assisted in the McCarthy purges, and linked to the Dallas YAF plot. Fr. Walsh himself had ties with a Nazi Major General, Karl Houshofer.

    Sven Kraemer, the son of the notorious Fritz Kraemer, links closely with Rev. Moon, the World Anti-Communist League, and the Pentagon.

    Mike Burke of G&W's Madison Square Garden had CIA connections, worked in an early plot to overthrow Albania, and links to Sonny Werblin at the Garden, an early Hollywood publicity agent for Reagan. (New York Times, 4/17/82)

    Banco Ambrosiano is now further scandalized by the recent discovery of guns and drugs at their Milan headquarters, part of an international traffic that ties to Nazi smuggling operations and CIA plots. (LA Herald, 11/26/83).

    Nugan Hand Bank, formed with the heroin profits of Southeast Asian CIA drug operations, and tied to various covert operations, ended in scandal and suicide. The story makes many more connections in this web. See "Australian Mystery," Wall Street Journal, 8/24-25-26,1982.

    135. The Secret History of the SS, Infield; Friendly Fascism, Bertram Gross; "U.S. Needs Military Coup," UPI, 10/21/81 (Sen. John Schmitz, CA).

    136. The Ominous Parallels: The End of Freedom in America, Peikoff ; Four Years of War Murders, Gumbell; Forgive My Grief (Vols. 1-4), Penn Jones, Jr. (JFK witness deaths); "30 Key Watergate Witnesses Met Violent Deaths," Brussell, Midnight Globe, 7/12/76; "The Serpent's Egg," film by Bergman.

    137. "In the Spirit of Jimmy Jones," Akwesasne Notes, Winter 1982 (photo of quote).

    138. "World Watcher's International," weekly casettes, Mae Brussell,; "Tom Davis Books," P.O. Box 1107, Aptos, CA 95001-1107,; The Continuing Inquiry, Penn Jones, Jr., Rt. 3, Box 356, Waxahachie, TX 76165; Parapolitics, Jonathan Marshall, 311 E. Reed St. #7, San Jose, CA 95112; Covert Action Information Bulletin, P.O. Box 50272, Washington, DC 20004; Counterspy, P.O. Box 647, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044; Grassy Knoll Gazette, P.O. Box 1465, Manchester, MA 01944; Organizing Notes, Campaign for Political Rights, 201 Mass. Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20002; Overthrow, P.O. Box 392, Canal St. Station, New York, NY 10013; Suppressed Facts Quarterly, c/o FAIRCO, P.O. Box 448, Shreveport, LA 71161; Casettes, Ted Gondolfo, 1214 First Ave., New York, NY 10021 (broadcasts, etc.); Coverups, Gary Mack, 4620 Brandingshire Place, Fort Worth, TX 76133; "CIA & the Nazis," cassette of Charles Allen, Jr., Jeff McConnell, Dept. of Linguistics, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139; Hearings on Nazi War Criminals, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees & International Law, 21-37 Rayburn HOB, Washington, DC 20515 (recent), and CONSPIRACY!, John Judge, P.O. Box 7147, Washington, DC 20044.

    The following is the prepared text of Henry Kissinger's May 10, 1982
    speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in
    commemoration of the Bicentenary of the Office of the Foreign
    Secretary. The speech was entitled, "Reflections on a Partnership:

    "British and American Attitudes To Postwar Foreign Policy."


    Michael Howard, in his earlier lecture in this series, confirmed what
    I suspected: that the United States deserves some of the credit for
    Britain's decision to create a Foreign Office in the first place. The
    Foreign Office was founded only a few months after the battle of
    Yorktown. The "politicians" of the time having just mislaid America,
    the need was evidently felt for some more professional machinery to
    run Britain's newly expanded sphere of "foreign" affairs.

    Since then, Britain and America have never ceased to play important
    roles in each other's history. On the whole it has been a productive
    and creative relationship, perhaps one of the most durable in the
    history of nations. In the last 200 years, we have approached each
    other sometimes warily, and dealt with foreign affairs often from
    different perspectives. Still, on balance the relationship has been
    of considerable benefit to world peace. This has been true
    particularly of the period since the Second World War.

    All accounts of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World
    War and in the early postwar period draw attention to the significant
    differences in philosophy between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston
    Churchill reflecting our different national histories. America, which
    had never experienced a foreign threat to her survival, considered
    wars an historical aberration caused by evil men or institutions; we
    were preoccupied with victory defined as the unconditional surrender
    of the Axis. Britain had seen aggression take too many forms to risk
    so personal a view of history; she had her eyes on the postwar world
    and sought to gear wartime strategy toward forestalling Soviet
    domination of Central Europe. Many American leaders condemned
    Churchill as needlessly obsessed with power politics, too rigidly
    anti-Soviet, too colonialist in his attitude to what is now called
    the Third World, and too little interested in building the
    fundamentally new international order toward which American idealism
    has always tended. The British undoubtedly saw the Americans as
    naive, moralistic, and evading responsibility for helping secure the
    global equilibrium. The dispute was resolved according to American
    preferences—in my view, to the detriment of postwar security.

    Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's rapid
    awakening to maturity in the years following. In the 1940s and '50s
    our two countries responded together to the geopolitical challenge of
    the Soviet Union and took the lead in creating the structures of
    Western cooperation for the postwar era which brought a generation of
    security and prosperity.

    In the process a rather ironic reversal of positions took place.
    Today it is the United States that is accused of being obsessed with
    the balance of power, and it is our European allies who are charged
    by us with moralistic escapism.

    I believe that the extraordinary partnerhsip among the democracies
    will overcome the occasional squabbles that form the headlines of the
    day and, even more important, meet the objective new challenges that
    our countries face.

    Philosophies Of Foreign Policy

    The disputes between Britain and America during the Second World War
    and after were, of course, not an accident. British policy drew upon
    two centuries of experience with the European balance of power,
    America on two centuries of rejecting it.

    Where America had always imagined itself isolated from world affairs,
    Britain for centuries was keenly alert to the potential danger that
    any country's domination of the European continent—whatever its
    domestic structure or method of dominance—placed British survival at
    risk. Where Americans have tended to believe that wars were caused by
    the moral failure of leaders, the British view is that aggression has
    thrived on opportunity as much as on moral propensity, and must be
    restrained by some kind of balance of power. Where Americans treated
    diplomacy as episodic—a series of isolated problems to be solved on
    their merits—the British have always understood it as an organic
    historical process requiring constant manipulation to keep it moving
    in the right direction.

    Britain has rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in
    the ultimate efficacy of technology, despite her achievements in this
    field. Philosophically, she remains Hobbesian: She expects the worst
    and is rarely disappointed. In moral matters Britain has
    traditionally practiced a convenient form of ethical egoism,
    believing that what was good for Britain was best for the rest. This
    requires a certain historical self-confidence, not to say nerve, to
    carry it off. But she has always practiced it with an innate
    moderation and civilized humaneness such that her presumption was
    frequently justified. In the Nineteenth Century, British policy was a—
    perhaps the—principal factor in a European system that kept the peace
    for 99 years without a major war.

    American foreign policy is the product of a very different tradition.
    The Founding Fathers, to be sure, were sophisticated men who
    understood the European balance of power and skillfully manipulated
    it to win independence. But for a century and more after that,
    America, comfortably protected by two oceans—which in turn were
    secured by the Royal Navy—developed the idiosyncratic notion that a
    fortunate accident was a natural state of affairs, that our
    involvement in world politics was purely a matter of choice. Where
    [President John Quincy Adams' Secretary of State] George Canning
    viewed the Monroe Doctrine in terms of the world equilibrium, "call
    [ing] the New World into existence to redress the balance of the
    Old," Americans imagined the entire Western Hemisphere a special
    case, safely insulated from the rest of the world. We had created a
    nation consciously dedicated to "self-evident" truths, and it was
    taken for granted in most American public discourse that our
    participation (or non-participation) in the world could be guided
    exclusively by moral precepts. That geography gave us this luxury was
    only evidence of God's blessing upon us; we owed Him that quid pro
    quo. The competitive, sometimes cynical, and always relativistic
    style of European power politics was viewed in America as an unsavory
    example of what to avoid and as further evidence of our moral

    In American discussion of foreign policy, even through much of the
    Twentieth Century, the phrase "balance of power" was hardly ever
    written or spoken without a pejorative adjective in front of it—
    the "outmoded" balance of power, the "discredited" balance of power.
    When Woodrow Wilson took America into the First World War, it was in
    the expectation that under American influence the postwar settlement
    would be governed by a "new and more wholesome diplomacy"
    transcending the wheeling and dealing, secrecy, and undemocratic
    practices that were thought to have produced the Great War. Franklin
    Roosevelt, on his return from the Crimean Conference in 1945, told
    the Congress of his hope that the postwar era would "spell the end of
    the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres
    of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients
    that have been tried for centuries—and have failed." Both Wilson and
    Roosevelt put their faith in a universal organization of collective
    security in which the peace-loving nations would combine to deter, or
    combat, the aggressors. It was assumed that all nations would come to
    the same conclusions regarding what constituted aggression and be
    equally willing to resist it, no matter where it occurred, regardless
    of how far from their borders, irrespective of the national interest

    In the American view, nations were either inherently peaceful or
    inherently warlike. Hence, after World War II the "peace-loving"
    U.S., Britain, and U.S.S.R. had together to police the world against
    Germany and Japan even though the former enemies had been rendered
    impotent by unconditional surrender. If there were doubts about the
    peace-loving virtue of our wartime allies, they seemed to many
    American leaders to apply as much to Britain as to the U.S.S.R.:
    Roosevelt toyed with the idea of non-alignment between a balance-of-
    power-oriented colonialist Britain and an ideologically obstreperous
    Soviet Union. Even Truman took care not to meet with Churchill in
    advance of the Potsdam Conference; he did not want to appear to
    be "lining up" with Britain against the U.S.S.R. The secret dream of
    American leaders, if great power conflict proved unavoidable, was to
    arrogate to themselves the role to which the non-aligned later
    aspired: that of moral arbiter, hurling condescending judgments down
    at all those engaged in the dirty game of international diplomacy.
    As late as 1949, the Department of State submitted to the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee a memorandum that strove mightily to
    distinguish the new North Atlantic Treaty from traditional military
    alliances and above all from any relationship to the very balance of
    power it was supposed to establish. The Treaty, the memorandum
    said, "is directed against no one; it is directed solely against
    aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting `balance of power'
    but to strengthen the `balance of principle.' "
    American attitudes until quite literally the recent decade have
    embodied a faith that historical experience can be transcended, that
    problems can be solved permanently, that harmony can be the natural
    state of mankind. Thus our diplomacy has often stressed the concepts
    of international law, with its procedures of arbitration and peaceful
    settlement, as if all political disputes were legal issues, on the
    premise that reasonable men and women could always find agreement on
    some equitable basis. Theodore Roosevelt won a Nobel Peace Prize for
    helping mediate the Russo-Japanese War in 1905; thus Alexander Haig's
    recent efforts on the Falklands have a long tradition behind them.
    There is also a perennial American assumption that economic well-
    being automatically ensures political stability, a belief which has
    animated American policies from Herbert Hoover's relief efforts after
    World War I to the Marshall Plan to the recent Caribbean initiative—
    never mind that, in many parts of the world, the timeframes for
    economic progress and the achievement of political stability may be
    seriously out of phase. In our participation in the two world wars of
    this century, and afterward, our bursts of energy were coupled with
    the conviction that our exertions had a terminal date, after which
    the natural harmony among nations would be either restored or

    Disillusionment was inevitable. America fluctuated between moral
    crusading and frustrated isolationism, between overextension and
    escapism, between extremes of intransigence and conciliation. But
    history was kind to us. For a long time it spared us from the need to
    face up to fundamental choices. Not being called upon to help
    preserve the equilibrium—a service rendered gratis by Great Britain—
    we could avoid the responsibility of permanent involvement in world
    politics, of unending exertion with no final answers or ultimate

    Even when the United States finally entered the world stage of
    permanent peacetime deplomacy after 1945, it did so under conditions
    that seemed to confirm our historical expectations. For several
    decades we had the overwhelming resources to give effect to our
    prescriptions, and thus conducted foreign policy by analogy to the
    great formative experiences of the 1930s and '40s: The New Deal
    translated into the Marshall Plan; resistance to Nazi aggression
    translated into the Korean "police action" and the policy
    of "containment." We tended to attribute our dominance in the Western
    Alliance to the virtue of our motives rather than to the
    preponderance of our power. In fact, the United States enjoyed nearly
    half the world's Gross National Product and an atomic monopoly; our
    NATO allies, given their dependence, conducted themselves less as
    sovereign nations than as lobbyists in Washington decision-making.

    It was therefore a rude awakening when in the 1960s and '70s the
    United States became conscious of the limits of even its resources.
    Now with a little over a fifth of the world's GNP, America was
    powerful but no longer dominant. Vietnam was the trauma and the
    catharsis but the recognition was bound to come in any event.
    Starting in the '70s, for the first time, the United States has had
    to conduct a foreign policy in the sense with which Europeans have
    always been familiar: as one country among many, unable either to
    dominate the world or escape from it, with the necessity of
    accommodation, maneuver, a sensitivity to marginal shifts in the
    balance of power, an awareness of continuity and of the
    interconnections between events.

    Our perennial domestic debates reflect the pain, and incompleteness,
    of that adjustment. The American Right still yearns for ideological
    victory without geopolitical effort; the American Left still dreams
    of reforming the world through the exercise of goodwill unsullied by
    power. We are edging towards a synthesis but it will be a slow,
    painful, perhaps bitter process.

    The Nature Of the Special Relationship

    That two countries with such divergent traditions could form a
    durable partnership is remarkable in itself. The periods of the close
    Anglo-American "special relationship," the object of such nostalgia
    today, were also times of occasional mutual exasperation.

    For quite a while we stressed different aspects of our histories; in
    more senses that one, we lived in different time zones. It was only
    some while after the settlement of the Alabama affair just over a
    century ago that American and British interests began to run
    parallel. The need for intimacy seemed to be greater on this side of
    the Atlantic (that is, in Britain), and Britain began to avoid
    alliances that could entangle her against the United States—including
    a tantalizing offer from Germany around the turn of the century.
    American memories were longer: The First World War was a temporary
    exertion, after which we withdrew into isolationism; during the '20s
    the U.S. Navy Department still maintained a "Red Plan" to deal with
    the contingency of conflict with the British fleet.

    It was not until the war with Hitler that the gap closed permanently.
    In the immediate postwar period we were held together by strategic
    circumstances which imposed the same necessities, whatever the
    different philosophical premises. American resources and organization
    and technological genius, and British experience and understanding of
    the European balance of power, were both needed to resist the sudden
    threat from the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan and North Atlantic
    Treaty, while formally American initiatives, were inconceivable
    without British advice and British efforts to organize a rapid and
    effective European response. Ernest Bevin, as Professor Howard
    pointed out in the first lecture, was the indispensable architect of
    the European response as well as the staunch helmsman of Britain's
    journey from power to influence.
    Even then, Anglo-American difficulties persisted occasionally. The
    anguished disagreements over immigration into Palestine; the
    misunderstandings over atomic cooperation; competition over Iranian
    oil; the abrupt, unilateral ending of Lend-Lease; and the race to
    demobilize were only some of the items in a stream of irritants. More
    serious policy differences were to follow in the '50s, causing
    Anthony Eden to reflect on the "tough reality of Anglo-American
    relations." Even when the politics were parallel, the personalities
    were often divergent. Eden and Dean Acheson were friends as well as
    colleagues; the same could not be said for Eden and John Foster
    Dulles. Misunderstandings and conflicts of interest continued through
    European integration, the rearmament of Germany, and Indochina, right
    up to the tragic climax of Suez—to which I will return in a few

    That these irritations never shook the underlying unity was due to
    statesmanship on both sides. One factor was a brilliant British
    adjustment to new circumstances. To the outside world it may have
    seemed that Britain clung far too long to the illusion of Empire; in
    her relations with Washington, she proved that an old country was
    beyond self-deception on fundamentals. Bevin, the unlikely originator
    of this revolution in British diplomacy, shrewdly calculated that
    Britain was not powerful enough to influence American policy by
    conventional methods of pressure or balancing of risks. But by
    discreet advice, the wisdom of experience, and the presupposition of
    common aims, she could make herself indispensable, so that American
    leaders no longer thought of consultations with London as a special
    favor but as an inherent component of our own decision-making. The
    wartime habit of intimate, informal collaboration thus became a
    permanent practice, obviously because it was valuable to both sides.

    The ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a
    source of wonder—and no little resentment—to third countries. Our
    postwar diplomatic history is littered with Anglo-American "arrangements"
    and "understandings," sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal
    documents. The stationing of B-29 atomic bombers in Britain in 1948 was
    agreed between political and service leaders but not committed to writing.
    Less happily, only general principles were recorded when Churchill and
    Roosevelt agreed in 1942 to cooperate in producing the atomic bomb. After
    Roosevelt died, Clement Attlee reflected with admirable restraint: "We
    were allies and friends. It didn't seem necessary to tie everything up."
    The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a
    participant in internal American deliberations, to a degree probably
    never before practiced between sovereign nations. In my period in
    office, the British played a seminal part in certain American
    bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—indeed, they helped
    draft the key document. In my White House incarnation then, I kept
    the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged
    than I did the American State Department—a practice which, with all
    affection for things British, I would not recommend be made
    permanent. But it was symptomatic.

    For a brief moment in the early 1970s, Britain seemed to decide to
    put an end to the special relationship in order to prove itself
    a "good European" in the year that it entered the European Community.
    The attempt was short-lived. By 1976, James Callaghan and Anthony
    Crosland had restored the traditional close relationship—without
    resurrecting the label—and it was enormously valuable, indeed
    indispensable, in the Southern Africa negotiations that began in that
    year. In my negotiations over Rhodesia I worked from a British draft
    with British spelling even when I did not fully grasp the distinction
    between a working paper and a Cabinet-approved document. The practice
    of collaboration thrives to our day, with occasional ups and downs
    but even in the recent Falkland crisis, an inevitable return to the
    main theme of the relationship.

    Clearly, British membership in Europe has added a new dimension. But
    the solution, in my view, is not to sacrifice the special intimacy of
    the Anglo-American connection on the altar of the European idea, but
    rather to replicate it on a wider plane of America's relations with
    all its European allies, whether bilaterally or with a politicallycohesive
    European Community—that is for Europe to decide. The special frankness
    and trust that may have been originally resorted to as compensation for a
    disparity of power may now be even more essential in the partnership of
    equals that must characterize the future relations between America and Europe.

    Britain, America, and Europe

    In fact, Europe has been a traumatic issue for both Britain and the United States.

    Americans often forget that Britain, too, has been a reluctant
    internationalist, at least as far as Europe was concerned. Tradition
    pulled Britain across distant oceans. The glory of foreign policy was
    identified with Empire and Commonwealth, its problems and perils with
    the continent of Europe. It was Czechoslovakia—in the heart of Europe—
    which Chamberlain described as a small faraway country of which
    Britons knew little—after a century and a half of fighting on the
    borders of India.

    In Britain, reluctance to enter Europe was always bipartisan, and
    somewhat mystical. Eden once said that Britain knew "in her bones"
    that she could not join it; and Hugh Gaitskell spoke of the impossibility of
    throwing off 1,000 years of history. But there were more substantial
    reasons: worries about sovereignty—which on the Left was combined with
    concern for the unfettered development of socialist planning; an
    instinctive disinclination to deal with continentals on an equal footing;
    trade ties with the Commonwealth; and the special relationship. Even
    Churchill, despite his intimations of the future, remained as ambivalent
    in government as he had been prescient in opposition when he had called
    as early as 1947 for a United States of Europe. In office, he never quite
    found the balance among his three concentric circles—the Commonwealth,
    Europe, and the English-speaking peoples.
    Only after Suez did the risks of isolation become obvious, as well as
    the opportunity that the emerging Europe offered for exercising in a
    different but equally effective form Britain's traditional role of
    guardian of continental equilibrium. If the economic benefits were
    ambiguous, the political necessities were not: Only as one of the
    leaders of Europe could Britain continue to play a major role on the
    world scene.

    By entering the European Community, Britain did not abandon her
    instinct for equilibrium. But for the first time in peacetime she
    threw herself into the scales. As I have already noted, she did so
    with the fervor of a frustrated convert who had been kept waiting for
    a decade at the doors of destiny.

    If Britain has had a difficult adjustment to make in its relationship
    to Europe, so has the United States.

    After the war, American leaders applied a heavy dose of our usual
    missionary zeal and the full rigor of our "problem-solving" energy to
    the task of promoting European integration. Federalism, of course,
    was a hallowed American principle. Shortly after the Philadelphia
    Convention, Benjamin Franklin was urging on the French the
    attractions of a federal Europe. A similar evangelism, in a more
    practical form, shone through the Marshall Plan. Even Acheson, not
    usually seen as a moralist, was carried away by the European idea; he
    recalled listening to Robert Schuman outlining his plan for a
    European Coal and Steel Community: "As he talked, we caught his
    enthusiasm and the breadth of his thought," Acheson wrote, "the
    rebirth of Europe, which, as an entity, had been in eclipse since the

    Despite the idealism of our commitment, tensions between America and
    a unified Europe were inherent in the logic of what we were so
    enthusiastically endorsing. We had grown accustomed to the
    devastated, temporarily impotent Europe of the postwar period; we
    forgot the Europe that had launched the industrial revolution, that
    had invented the concept of national sovereignty, and that had
    operated a complex balance of power for three centuries. A Europe
    reasserting its personality was bound to seek to redress the balance
    of influence with the United States; Charles de Gaulle in this
    respect differed largely in method from Jean Monnet, who never
    disguised his hopes for a more powerful and effective European voice.

    Thus, later American disillusionments were inherent in our goals. It
    was naive for Americans to take for granted that a federal Europe
    would be more like us, that a united Europe would automatically help
    carry our burdens, and that it would continue to follow American
    global prescriptions as it had in the early postwar years of European
    recovery—and dependency. That cannot be so.

    Yet even if some of our more unhistorical expectations were
    disappointed, our original judgment was correct: European unity,
    strength, and self-confidence are essential for the future of the
    West. It is beyond the psychological resources of the United States—
    not only the physical—to be the sole or even the principal center of
    initiative and responsibility in the non-Communist world. (This is
    one reason why I always favored the independent British and French
    nuclear deterrents.) American support for European unification was
    therefore an expression of self-interest even if it paraded under the
    banner of altruism; it was to our advantage even if we paid occasionally
    in the coin of clashing perspectives—provided we found a way toward
    creative unity on fundamentals.

    Britain, Europe, The United States, AnddThe Soviet Union

    The central foreign policy problem that Britain, America, and Europe
    have had to confront together since 1945 is, of course, the Soviet
    Union. And the need for creative unity among us as we do so has not

    One thing that is clear from the historical record is that neither
    side of the Atlantic has had a monopoly of special insight into this
    problem. As soon as the war had ended, both Britain and America fell
    over each other in the rush to demobilize. All American troops were
    due to leave Europe by 1947. After a visit to Moscow in May 1945,
    Harry Hopkins told President Truman that he saw no major sources of
    conflict between America and Russia on the horizon.

    After Churchill left office, British policy for a brief period
    ironically fell prey to some of the same illusions that had bedeviled
    American leaders. The Labour government at first hoped that "Left
    could speak unto Left." The brief moment of nostalgia reflected the
    hope that Britain would stand neither for the unbridled capitalism of
    the United States nor for Soviet Communism. A resolution calling for
    the "progressive unity" between the British Labour and Communist
    parties was only narrowly defeated. There is not much doubt, in fact,
    that once the U.S. was committed after the Greek-Turkish aid program
    in 1947, some in Britain were tempted—as Roosevelt and Truman a few
    years earlier—by the idea of enhancing British influence by remaining
    aloof not just from Europe but from the emerging superpower
    confrontation, adding to her traditional role as manipulator of the
    balance in Europe that of intermediary between East and West. This
    attitude has reappeared in some circles in Europe today.

    No amount of revisionist distortion can change the fact that it was
    the Kremlin which turned Anglo-American hopes into mirages. There is
    today in some circles a curious assumption of diabolic Soviet
    cleverness and foresight. Yet in those years, Stalin's conduct of
    relations with his former allies made him the chief architect of
    NATO. A few more fleeting smiles on the wooden features of Mr.
    Molotov, and a modicum of self-restraint and diplomatic delicacy,
    would have done much to prise apart the young and still brittle
    Atlantic cooperation: and all the boys might have been home, as
    planned, by 1947.

    The Soviets did not manage this degree of subtlety. Instead, Moscow
    went out of its way to estrange and alienate, where it could have
    softened through a little courtship, however heavy-handed. The
    Russians declined Britain's invitation to send a Soviet contingent to
    a victory parade, and Stalin side-stepped an offer from Attlee to
    renew the wartime alliance. Every door that Ernest Bevin, mindful of
    the influential left wing of his party, was careful to keep open was
    resoundingly slammed and loudly bolted. As was soon to be shown in
    the persecution of social democrats in Eastern Europe, the Soviet
    Union countenanced only one form of "socialism" and fought other,
    democratic versions even more bitterly than capitalists. The outright
    Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan was an egregious blunder; a
    mild expression of interest, however disingenuous, could have caused
    untold disruption and delay in the Western camp. Acceptance would
    have changed the face of postwar politics.

    It was one of those moments when America's activism and idealism
    brought out the best in her. The '40s were years of imaginative men
    and bold measures on both sides of the Atlantic: The Marshall Plan,
    the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin airlift, the Brussels treaty, and
    finally NATO, were inspired and creative initiatives. And in the
    years following, the United States and its allies stood fast against
    Soviet pressures and blackmail in crises over Korea, Berlin, and
    missiles in Cuba.

    But we in America had only begun to scratch the surface of the long-
    term problem of U.S.-Soviet relations in the nuclear age, which would
    soon produce more ambiguous challenges. The problem was, at bottom,
    conceptual. Americans were uncomfortable with the notion of a Cold
    War. They tended to treat war and peace as two distinct phases of
    policy. Total victory was the only legitimate goal for war;
    conciliation the appropriate method for peace. In this sense the
    postwar period fulfilled neither of America's conceptual
    expectations. If in wartime we lacked a sense of political strategy,
    in peacetime we had difficulty forming an understanding of the
    permanent relation between power and diplomacy. The policy of
    containment, and its variant called "negotiation from strength," was
    based on the experience with the anti-Hitler coalition. It focused on
    the buildup of military strength towards some hypothetical day of
    greater parity; it aimed at eventual negotiation of some kind with
    the Soviet Union but offered no clue as to either its timing or its
    content, nor even a clear definition of the nature of the relevant
    military strength. George Kennan's famous "X" article in Foreign
    Affairs in 1947 looked vaguely to the eventual "mellowing" of the
    Soviet system; Dean Acheson spoke of building "situations of
    strength" which, somewhere down the road, would induce the
    Kremlin "to recognize the facts. . . ." But how precisely this
    negotiation would emerge or to what end it would be conducted was
    left vague.

    The flaw in containment was not only, as the cliché has it today,
    that it was overly preoccupied with military counterforce but that it
    misunderstood that the West in the immediate postwar period was
    precisely at the apex of its relative strength. Containment thus
    deferred the moment for a diplomatic encounter with the Soviet Union
    to a later time by which Soviet power could only have grown. In 1945
    the United States had an atomic monopoly and the Soviet Union was
    devastated by 20 million casualties. Our policy paradoxically gave
    the Kremlin time to consolidate its conquests and to redress the
    nuclear imbalance. The West's military and diplomatic position
    relative to the U.S.S.R. was never more favorable than at the very
    beginning the containment policy in the late '40s. That was the time
    to attempt a serious discussion on the future of Europe and a
    peaceful world.

    As so often, Winston Churchill understood it best. In a much-
    neglected speech at Llandudno in October 1948, out of office, he said:

    "The question is asked: What will happen when they get the atomic
    bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge
    yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these
    things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry? If
    they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the
    world, trusting to our Christian and altruistic inhibitions against
    using this strange new power against them, what will they do when
    they themselves have huge quantities of atomic bombs? . . . No one in
    his senses can believe that we have a limitless period of time before
    us. We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement.
    We ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting
    for something to turn up, by which I mean waiting for something bad
    for us to turn up. The Western Nations will be far more likely to
    reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate
    their just demands while they have the atomic power and before the
    Russian Communists have got it too."

    So the postwar world came into being. A precarious peace was
    maintained, based on a nuclear equilibrium, with occasional
    negotiations to ease tensions temporarily, but ultimately dependent
    on a balance of terror. The problem of maintaining security took on
    an unprecedented new dimension. Technology was soon to make the
    United States directly vulnerable to attack; the Atlantic Alliance
    increasingly based its defense strategy on reliance on weapons of
    mass destruction that posed risks more and more difficult to
    reconcile with the objectives being defended.

    In the nuclear age, peace became a moral imperative. And it imposed a
    new dilemma: The desire for peace is the mark of all civilized men
    and women. Yet the democracies' desire for peace, if divorced from a
    commitment to defend freedom, could turn into a weapon of blackmail
    in the hands of the most ruthless; if the desire to avoid nuclear war
    turns into undifferentiated hysteria, nuclear blackmail may well be
    encouraged. The problem of the relationship of power to peace, the
    balance between ends and means, has been evaded for a generation by
    an abdication to technology. But history tolerates no evasions. To
    develop a strategy that relates ends to means, to build military
    forces that avoid the choice between Armageddon and surrender, is a
    preeminent moral as well as political problem for our period. Of at
    least equal importance is to develop an Allied consensus behind
    proposals of arms control based on analysis not panic and freed of
    either the conquest for confrontation or the tendency towards

    Third World Perspectives:

    What Is The Limit Of Inter-Allied Conflict?

    In a period of nuclear stalemate, ironically, conflict became more
    likely at the level of local, non-nuclear crisis. In the age of
    decolonization, many of these clashes were bound to occur in the
    Third World. This was another area in which, in the immediate postwar
    period, American and European attitudes diverged sharply.

    Americans from Franklin Roosevelt onward believed that the United
    States, with its "revolutionary" heritage, was the natural ally of
    peoples struggling against colonialism; we could win the allegiance
    of these new nations by opposing and occasionally undermining our
    European allies in the areas of their colonial dominance. Churchill,
    of course, resisted these American pressures, as did the French and
    some other European powers for a longer period than did Britain.

    As Europe decolonized, partly under American pressure, there began a
    reversal of roles, the march by each side towards the philosophical
    positions vacated by the other—to an America focused on international
    security and Europe affirming general moral precepts of conduct. On
    Third World issues especially, many in Europe have ended up adopting
    the attitude embodied in Roosevelt's anti-colonialism and
    Eisenhower's conduct over Suez. Now Europe would seek to identify
    with Third World aspirations, economic and political, intensifying
    its efforts at conciliation the more insistent, peremptory, and
    radical that Third World demands become. At the same time, the United
    States, at least in some administrations, has come to a perception
    closer to Eden's: that appeasement of radical challenges only
    multiplies radical challenges.
    Different perceptions of national interest were involved as well.
    Thus in the India-Pakistan war of 1971 Britain did not share our
    sense of concern for the country which had opened the first tenuous
    links to China; the historic nostalgia for India was too strong. So
    too in the early stages of the Falkland crisis America hesitated
    between its Atlantic and its Western Hemisphere vocations. But
    neither of these disagreements did any lasting damage. In the end we
    came together; the old friendship prevailed over other considerations.

    The lesson I draw is that in the Third World we may occasionally
    operate from different perspectives. But we must take care not to let
    these differences reach a point where they undermine the basic self-
    confidence and sense of mission of the other party, lest we threaten
    prospects for progress and stability transcending the immediate issue.

    In this context the experience of Suez is instructive. Our prolonged
    and never-reconciled clash had lasting consequences not only for the
    Middle East and the Third World but also for the long-term evolution
    of Western policies.

    The details of that disaster are not relevant to my immediate
    purpose. The British-French expedition against the Suez Canal was
    clearly misconceived. The fact remains that Eden had got hold of what
    was intellectually the right problem, while the American reaction,
    among other things, begged some crucial questions: to what extent
    our "revolutionary" historical analogy was relevant; to what extent
    it was wise to humiliate one's closest ally; and what would be the
    long-term consequence of such a course.
    Britain and France, in my view, were acting on a strategic analysis
    which may have been traditional and even self-serving but was far
    from frivolous. Nasser was the first Third World leader to accept
    Soviet arms and to play the radical, pro-Soviet game in an attempt to
    blackmail the West. Eden's perception was that a dangerous precedent
    was being set: can there be any dispute of this today? Had Nasser's
    course been shown a failure, a quite different pattern of
    international relations would have developed, at least for a decade
    or more. As it turned out, Nasser's policy was vindicated;
    revolutions spread in the Middle East in the following years, and he
    has countless imitators today around the world relying on Soviet arms
    to increase their influence and to destabilize their neighbors.

    Even more important, our humiliation of Britain and France over Suez
    was a shattering blow to these countries' role as world powers. It
    accelerated their shedding of international responsibilities, some of
    the consequences of which we saw in succeeding decades when reality
    forced us to step into their shoes—in the Persian Gulf, to take one
    notable example. Suez thus added enormously to America's burdens—and
    simultaneously fueled a European resentment at America's global role
    which continues to this day.

    It is clear that a world of progress and peace requires that more
    than 100 new and developing nations be made part of the international
    system; no international order can survive unless they feel a stake
    in it. It is incontestable that many conflicts in the developing world arise
    from legitimate social, economic, or political grievances; this, however,
    does not exclude the possibility that these can be exploited by extremists
    and turned against the long-term security interests of the West. The
    democracies, whatever their shifting positions, have failed to relate their
    philosophical and moral convictions to a coherent analysis of the nature
    of revolution and an understanding of how best to foster moderation.
    Above all, disputes among the democracies over this problem should not be
    permitted to turn into a kind of guerrilla warfare between allies.
    Whatever the merit of the individual issue, the price will be a
    weakening of the West's overall psychological readiness to maintain
    the global balance.

    The strategic position or self-confidence of a close ally on a matter
    it considers of vital concern must not be undermined. It is a principle of
    no little contemporary relevance. In this sense the Falkland crisis in the
    end will strengthen Western cohesion.

    Suez, by weakening Europe's sense of its own importance as a world
    power, accelerated the trend of Europe's seeking refuge in the role
    of "mediator" between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
    role that some American leaders naively saw the United States as
    playing between Churchill and Stalin, in the end too many Europeans
    seek to adopt between Washington and Moscow.

    It is not a new phenomenon. It began, at least where Britain was
    involved, as wise advice to us that negotiation could be an element
    of strategy. This is a lesson of which Americans often need to be
    reminded. It has its antecedents in Attlee's flight to Washington for
    reassurance when Truman seemed to hint at using nuclear weapons in
    Korea; in Eden's efforts at various Geneva conferences to sponsor a
    dialogue in the era of Dulles's moralism; in Macmillan's appearance
    in an astrakhan hat in Moscow in 1959; in the strenuous Western
    European importunings of the Nixon Administration in 1969 to join
    Europe in the pursuit of détente. But carried too far, it runs the
    risk of abdicating any share of responsibility for a cohesive Western
    strategy toward the U.S.S.R., or toward anti-Western radicalism in
    the Third World.

    And thus we see the ironic shift of positions reflected in some of
    our contemporary debates. The deprecation of the importance of power,
    the abstract faith in goodwill, the belief in the pacific efficacy of
    economic relations, the evasion of the necessities of defense and
    security, the attempt to escape from the sordid details of maintaining
    the global balance of power, the presumption of superior morality—
    these features once characteristic of America now seem to be more
    common in Europe. Where the United States has never quite abandoned
    its earlier moralism or fully developed a concept of equilibrium as
    Europe had once maintained, many in Europe paradoxically seem to
    have adopted some of the illusions that Americans clung to in years
    of isolation from responsibility.

    The unity of the industrial democracies remains crucial to the
    survival of democratic values and of the global equilibrium. We must
    at last answer the perennial questions of all alliances: How much
    unity do we need? How much diversity can we stand? An insistence on
    unanimity can be a prescription for paralysis. But if every ally acts
    as it pleases, what is the meaning of alliance? There is no more
    important task before the Alliance than to deal with these problems
    concretely, seriously, and above all immediately.

    The Contemporary Debate

    Let me make a few general points, therefore, about the contemporary
    debates between America and Europe.

    l do not claim that the United States is always correct in its perceptions.
    But Europeans ought to take care not to generate such frustrations in
    America that either an embittered nationalism, or unilateralism, or a
    retreat from world affairs could result.

    l fully acknowledge that the United States by its actions has sometimes
    stimulated or intensified the feelings in Europe that Europe had to strive
    to maintain its own interests, its own policies, its own identity. Indeed,
    as l said, naive American expectations that a rejuvenated Europe would
    follow our lead are partly responsible for the sometimes petulant
    reaction to Europe's assertions of its own role. In recent times the
    United States may have appeared unintentionally callous toward the
    danger of nuclear war or insufficiently alert toward the opportunities
    for peace. But the United States has nevertheless been more nearly
    correct than its critics in warning that those who seek peace not
    backed by strength will sooner or later find the terms of peace dictated
    to them; that peace to be meaningful must be just; that nations live in
    history, not utopia, and thus must approach their goals in stages. To ask for
    perfection as a precondition of action is self-indulgence, and in the
    end an abdication.

    Observers, including myself, have been sounding the alarm for decades
    about this or that "crisis" in the Western Alliance. But today's, l
    am afraid, is more genuinely, objectively, serious than ever. It
    comes after decades of a relentless Soviet military buildup, when the
    West, for a decade, is edging in some areas toward a dangerous
    dependency on economic ties with the East; while in Poland the Soviet
    Union enforces the unity of its empire, its clients press on to
    undermine the security interests of the West from Southeast Asia to
    the Middle East to Africa to Central America. Not all our
    difficulties are caused by the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union has
    shown little restraint in exploiting them, and their solution—whatever
    their cause—has been impeded by the lack of a unified Western response.

    One of Britain's contributions to the Western Alliance has been to
    supply a needed global perspective: the knowledge, from centuries of
    experience in Europe, that peace requires some clear-eyed notion of
    equilibrium and a willingness to maintain it; the insight, from
    centuries of world leadership, that Europe's security cannot be
    isolated from the broader context of the global balance; the
    awareness, from heroic exertions in this century, that those who
    cherish the values of Western civilization must be willing to defend
    them. In the Falkland crisis, Britain is reminding us all that certain
    basic principles such as honor, justice, and patriotism remain valid
    and must be sustained by more than words.

    The issue before the allies now is not to assess blame but to face
    our future. An alliance at odds over central issues of East-West
    diplomacy, economic policy, the Middle East, Central America, Africa,
    and relations with the Third world is in serious, and obvious,
    difficulty. Indeed it cannot be called an alliance if it agrees on no
    significant issue. Sooner or later such divisions must affect the
    field of security. For too long, all of us in the community of free
    nations have put off the uncomfortable questions; our evasions are
    now coming home to roost.

    Thirty-five years ago after the war, the democracies for a time
    overestimated the immediate dangers and underestimated their own
    capabilities; yet in the end they came up with a creative and
    effective response. Today too, we may be underrating our own
    capacities and confusing long- and short-term dangers.

    The strange aspect is that the disarray is taking place at the
    precise moment that the bankruptcy of the system that denies the
    human spirit seems to become clear beyond doubt. The Communist world
    has fundamental systemic problems and has not shown any ability to
    solve them except by recurrent brute force, which only delays the day
    of reckoning. In the 65-year history of the Soviet state, it has never
    managed a legitimate, regular succession of its political leadership;
    the country faces the demographic timebomb of its growing non-Russian
    population, soon to be a majority. The system has failed to deal
    seriously with the desire for political participation of its intellectual
    and managerial elite. Or else it has sought to preempt their political
    aspirations by turning the ruling group into a careerist "new class"
    bound to produce stagnation if not corruption. Its ideology is a
    discredited failure, without legitimacy, leaving the Communist Party
    a smug privileged elite with no function in the society except its
    own self-perpetuation, struggling to deal with bottlenecks and
    crises which its own rigidity has caused. It is an historic joke
    that the ultimate crisis in every Communist state, latent if not
    evident, is over the role of the Communist Party.

    Soviet economic performance is a disaster. It seems impossible to run
    a modern economy by a system of total planning, yet it seems
    impossible to maintain a Communist state without a system of total
    planning. How ironic that the West is tearing itself apart over how
    best to coordinate Western financial, technological, and agricultural
    aid to a so-called "superpower" incapable of sustaining a modern

    In short, if Moscow is prevented by a coordinated Western policy from
    deflecting its internal tensions into international crises, it is likely
    to find only disillusionment in the boast that history is on its side.

    It is the Communist world, not the West, that faces a profound
    systemic crisis. Ours are problems of coordination and policy, theirs
    are of structure. And therefore it is not beyond the realm of hope
    that a coherent, unified Western policy could at long last bring into
    view the prospect of a negotiated global settlement that Churchill
    foresaw at Llandudno.

    The solutions to the West's problems are, to a significant degree, in
    our own hands.

    One problem is that the democracies have no forum for addressing the
    future in a concrete way, let alone harmonizing disagreements or
    implementing common policies. As my friend Christopher Soames has
    recently emphasized, the Atlantic Alliance has no institutional
    machinery for addressing economic or Third World issues, or any long-
    term political strategy; the European Community, while eminently
    successful in its political coordination, has no mechanism as yet for
    formulating a coherent European view on matters of defense. The
    economic summits of Western and Japanese leaders, begun in the mid-
    '70s, are an attempt to surmount this procedural impasse, but they
    can do little more than call key leaders' attention to key problems
    in an informal, unsystematic way. Procedures do not solve substantive
    problems. Nevertheless, creating an appropriate forum for broader and
    deeper consultation would be an important first step.

    America has learned much in the postwar period, perhaps most of all
    from Britain. In the last decade we have also learned something of
    our limits, and in the new Administration we have shaken off the
    trauma of perhaps excessive preoccupation with our limits. An America
    that has recovered its vitality and its faith in the future is as
    much in the interests of the West as a Europe shaping its identity.

    Both Britain and America have learned that whatever their histories,
    their futures are part of the common destiny of freedom. Experience
    has taught that moral idealism and geopolitical insight are not
    alternatives but complementary; our civilization may not survive
    unless we possess both in full measure. Britain and America, which
    have contributed so much to the free world's unity and strength, have
    another opportunity now, together with our allies, to show that the
    democratic nations are the masters of their destiny.

    Thank you.